What's in the Senate permitting deal, and what it could mean for US emissions

A provision-by-provision scorecard of the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act of 2026: who each part helps today, and the likely direction and rough scale of its effect on US emissions.

Senate draft of Sept. 30, 2026 · Analysis by Zeke Hausfather, The Climate Brink

Emissions scale (author judgment): small <10moderate 10–100large >100 MtCO₂/yr Dots are blue if a provision lowers emissions, red if it raises them, gray if either way.

Provision	What it does	Helps	Emissions
Mostly helps clean energy
Transmission§§2101–2105, 2109	FERC backstop siting without a DOE corridor; interregional planning → If transmission grew only ~1%/yr, >80% of the IRA’s potential 2030 cuts would be lost (REPEAT, 2022) source	CLEAN	↓ Lowerslarge
Interconnection queues§§2106, 2110, 2111	Planned zones with fixed connection costs; faster, automated studies → ~85% of the 2,061 GW waiting to connect is solar, wind and storage; median wait 61 months (LBNL) source	CLEAN	↓ Lowersmoderate
Renewables and geothermal§§2213–2214, 2221–2228	Faster decisions on public land; annual geothermal lease sales	CLEAN	↓ Lowerssmall
Historic-preservation reviews§2301	Visual impacts on historic sites mostly no longer count as ‘adverse’	CLEAN	↓ Lowerssmall
Offshore wind leasing§§2251–2252	Looser ‘interference with other uses’ test; preferred cable routes	CLEAN	↓ Lowerssmall
Cuts both ways
NEPA deadlines and lawsuit limits§§1106, 1110, 2201	Tighter review deadlines; 150 days to sue; courts can’t cancel permits → Clean projects outnumbered fossil 2.4:1 in 2010–18 energy EISs and 2:1 in lawsuits (Bennon & Wilson) source	BOTH	↓ Lowers, on netmoderate
Permit certainty and deadlines§§1401, 1402(c), 1403	Protects issued permits; forces decisions on stalled non-NEPA permits → 57 GW of wind, solar and hybrid canceled or delayed by federal actions (plaintiffs’ est.): 44–88 MtCO₂/yr if built source	BOTH	↓ Lowers, for nowmoderate
Damages for permit discrimination§1402	Large damages if agencies intentionally delay or deny a project type	BOTH	↕ Either wayunknown
Mostly helps fossil fuels
Gas pipeline expansion§§2102(b), 1202, 1204	Looping and compression in existing corridors skip NEPA; state water-quality vetoes narrowed, federal wetland permits eased (helps power lines too) → Each 1 Bcf/d of added capacity ≈ 20 MtCO₂/yr if fully used (gross) source	FOSSIL	↑ Likely raisesmoderate
Onshore oil and gas drilling§§2211, 2229	No federal permit for many private-land wells; broader NEPA exemptions → Output is set mostly by prices; ~57% of added federal oil displaces production elsewhere (RFF) source	FOSSIL	↑ Raisessmall

Notes

Scale ratings are the author's qualitative judgments of how much each provision could change US emissions; the bill has not been modeled. Numbers are context anchors, not estimates of the bill's effect.
'Helps' reflects who faces federal obstacles and most NEPA reviews today; neutral provisions can protect either side under future administrations.
Wind/solar anchor assumes a 25-35% capacity factor and 0.35-0.50 tCO2/MWh displaced.
Also in the bill: faster Endangered Species Act consultations and limits on challenges (secs. 1302-1305), which cut both ways.
Not in this bill (unlike the 2024 Manchin-Barrasso bill): mandatory oil and gas lease sales, coal leasing, or an LNG-specific export deadline (general permit clocks could still reach DOE). The July 2025 budget law already mandated oil, gas and coal leasing; DOE lifted the LNG export pause in Jan. 2025.

Data

The same table as a CSV file, one row per provision. Please credit Zeke Hausfather, The Climate Brink.

Download CSV

The graphic

Scorecard graphic of the Senate permitting deal: provisions grouped as mostly helping clean energy, cutting both ways, or mostly helping fossil fuels, each with its likely emissions direction and scale, matching the table above.

Notes

Data

The graphic

Sources